LEADERSHIP: The Plan
Due to Yamamoto’s loyalty to his superiors and country, he followed through with planning the attack. As tensions grew between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese Combined Fleet prepared Yamamoto’s daring proposal, consisting of careful strategies with an emphasis on aviation. By the end of 1940, Japanese agents were assigned to various listening posts in Mexico and the Pacific to learn about the movements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Japanese admirals, who were more inclined to traditional military thinking, opposed Yamamoto. Yamamoto threatened to retire if his all-out demoralizing plan was not implemented. Yamamoto’s plan was officially approved by Admiral Nagano Osami, Chief of Naval Operations, on 20 October 1941.
“For the navy, the most urgent task of all is to make rapid strides in the field of aviation . . . ” (Hoyt 82).
- Yamamoto's letter to
Lieutenant Commander Miwa Yoshitake,
10 November 1934
“Should Japan go to war, one would have to resign oneself to it as unavoidable and throw oneself wholeheartedly into the fight, yet I believe it should be delayed just as long as possible so as to allow Japan all available time to concentrate on preparing itself” (Agawa 159).
- Letter from Yamamoto to Koga Mineichi,
Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet
“The first stage of operations--i.e., the assault on the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies--will, I'm sure, prove no trouble; the real outcome will be determined after that, in the second stage, and we should be making our mental and physical preparations accordingly . . . However, operations from then on will need to be based on a perfect blending of the administrative and the strategic, and I wonder whether we have the men of ability required to carry this through . . .” (Agawa 86).
- Yamamoto's letter to his nephew,
December 1941